GeMSS: A Great Multivariate Short Signature by Casanova, Antoine et al.
GeMSS: A Great Multivariate Short Signature
Principal submitter
This submission is from the following team, listed in alphabetical order:
• A. Casanova, CS
• J.-C. Faugère, INRIA and Sorbonne Universities/UPMC Univ Paris 06
• G. Macario-Rat, Orange
• J. Patarin, University of Versailles
• L. Perret, Sorbonne Universities/UPMC Univ Paris 06 and INRIA
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1 Introduction
sparkling GeMSS spring up from the night sky
a dazzling splendor to ever beautify
sequined glories that verily eye smack
sparkling GeMSS spring up from night sky
studding the vast backdrop of black
The purpose of this document is to present GeMSS : a Great Multivariate Signature Scheme. As
suggested by its name, GeMSS is a multivariate-based [14, 22, 4, 2, 20, 19] signature scheme produc-
ing small signatures. It has a fast verification process, and a medium/large public-key. GeMSS is in
direct lineage from QUARTZ [18] and borrows some design rationale of the Gui multivariate signature
scheme [5]. The former schemes are built from the Hidden Field Equations crypotsystem (HFE) [17,
published in 1996] by using the so-called minus and vinegar modifiers, i.e. HFEv- [12]. It is fair to
say that HFE, and its variants, are the most studied schemes in multivariate cryptography. QUARTZ
produces signatures of 128 bits for a security level of 80 bits and was submitted to the Nessie Ecrypt
competition [15] for public-key signatures. In contrast to many multivariate schemes, no practical
attack has been reported against QUARTZ. This is remarkable knowing the intense activity in the
cryptanalysis of multivariate schemes, e.g. [16, 13, 7, 8, 11, 10, 6, 9, 4, 2, 3, 1, 19, 21]. The best
known attack remains [8] that serves as a reference to set the parameters for GeMSS.
GeMSS is a faster variant of QUARTZ that incorporates the latest results in multivariate cryp-
tography to reach higher security levels than QUARTZ whilst improving efficiency.
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2 Advantages and limitations (2.B.6)
Since the first scheme of Mastumoto and Imai [14] in 1988, almost 30 years ago, multivariate-based
cryptosystems have been extensively analysed in the literature. We have designed GeMSS using this
knowledge and taking conservative choices for deriving parameters. We also performed practical
experiments using the best known tools for computing Gröbned bases.
From a practical point of view, the main drawback of GeMSS is the size of the public-key.
However, we mention that the generation of a (public-key,secret-key) remains rather efficient in
GeMSS. The main advantages of GeMSS are the size of the signatures generated, about 2λ bits,
and the fast verification process.
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